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Designing Autonomous Robot Missions with Performance Guarantees*
D.M. Lyons, Member, IEEE, R.C. Arkin, Fellow, IEEE,
P. Nirmal, Student Member, IEEE, and S. Jiang Student Member, IEEE

Abstract— This paper describes the need and methods
required to construct an integrated software verification and
mission specification system for use in robotic missions
intended for counter-weapons of mass destruction (c-WMD)
operations, as part of a 3-year effort for the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency. The overall system architecture is
described. The principal tool for verification is a process
algebra, PARS, based on port automata theory. PARS is
introduced, emphasizing its ability to represent probabilistic
programs and uncertain and dynamic environments, followed
by the analysis of mission properties for an example robotic
mission.
Keywords; mobile robots, performance guarantees, formal
properties, verification, robot programming.

I. INTRODUCTION
In an ongoing project for the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, we are developing methods to provide explicit
performance guarantees for critical missions for autonomous
and semi-autonomous robots. These specifically focus on
counter-weapons of mass destruction operations, such as
might be encountered in search, containment, and/or
neutralization of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons,
typically in urban indoor environments. Performance
guarantees are essential for these missions as there may be
only one opportunity to engage in the operation: failure may
not be an option.
Toward that end, the project’s goals include the design of
a robotic software architecture that includes pre-mission
performance analysis tools and methods for clearly
presenting and confirming operator intention and acceptance
of the mission, based on the level of success predicted and
presented by said analysis. The system architecture also will
allow for iterative refinement prior to deployment to
maximize the likelihood of success derived for feedback from
the verification methods, and the opportunity for the operator
to make a go-no go decision based on these results. This
research builds on our previously developed and usabilitytested mission specification software system, MissionLab1
[22][24] and earlier research on performance guarantees for
similar systems [20]. The overall intent is to provide highly
reliable performance bounds for autonomous robots operating
in uncertain environments, so that the robot can get it right
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the first time.
In Section II we review relevant literature as a basis for
presenting our System Architecture in Section III and our
Verification Model in Section IV. Verifying probabilistic
robot programs has unique challenges, including handling
real-valued variables representing durations, positions and
velocities, and an environment replete with dynamic and
concurrent activities as well as uncertainty. Arguing from the
unique characteristics of robot computation, we propose a
concept, the system period, to analyze this computationally
complex problem. We introduce a process algebra to analyze
the structure of the system of robot program and environment
model to identify the system period. In Section V, we
introduce our principal verification algorithms using a series
of examples and conclude the paper with a summary and
discussion in Section VI.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Many robot software development frameworks exist today
that can be potentially extended to include a verification
component for the resulting robot program. Player/Stage is a
robot programming environment developed at USC Robotics
Research Lab [15]. Player was designed to be a robot device
server that provides interface to a robot’s sensors and
actuators via TCP sockets. Pyro, or Python Robotics, is a
Python-based programming framework that allows users to
write robot-independent programs [7]. The authors of Pryo
intended to use it as a tool for teaching robotics at a higher
level without the students worrying about low-level control.
URBI, a Universal Robotic Body Interface, is a programming
environment based on the client/server architecture [6].
Microsoft Robotics Studios (MSRS) is a programming
environment for robot control based on Windows OS [17].
MSRS also has a powerful 3D physics simulator for robot
controllers. MSRS includes a visual programming language
(VPL) that is translated into C# code for compilation. ROS,
or the Robotic Operating System, is a software development
framework that provides operating system like functionality
for robot devices [25]. The Common Control Language
(CCL) provides a mission programming environment tailored
for multiple autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) [11].
CCL addressed the main issues of communication and
coordination among AUVs. We chose MissionLab [24][22]
as the software infrastructure to build our mission verification
tool upon because (1) it has a usability-tested [21][14]
graphical programming interface where a user can create her
program as visual, finite state automata (FSAs), and (2) the
high-level FSA is translated to a dataflow language [23] that
is compatible with the proposed verification algorithm.
The automated verification problem for robot programs
differs from the general automated verification problem
addressed by the field of model checking [10][18] in several
very important aspects. The behavior of a robot controlled

by a specific program will be different in different physical
environments. Thus, we need to include a model of the
environment as part of the verification problem. We
represent the robot program as a process that communicates
through its sensor and actuator processes with an
environment process forming a single network of
communicating processes as shown in Figure 1. In fact, for a
realistic example, each of the processes shown in Figure 1
will consist of hierarchically nested process networks.
Sensors

Environment

Program
Actuators

Figure 1: Program and Environment Network.

Discrete-Event Control (DEC) considers the analysis of a
controller coupled to a plant model [26]. DEC approaches
have been combined with model-checking software for the
automated generation of higher-level robot controllers in
[12][19]. While many of the techniques developed there can
be applied to parts of our problem, we have to deal with the
combined issues of representing real-valued variables
concurrent activities and uncertainty. The variables may
represent robot positions or velocities, or the duration or
occurrence time of events, or the probability of a sensed
feature or landmark. Concurrency is important to
realistically represent the way the environment changes
while the robot program is executing. The inclusion of
uncertainty is important to handle the characterization of
realistic environments as well as to probabilistic programs.
Software verification captures the effect of computation as
a trajectory in the state-space that is the Cartesian product of
the value sets for all the variables in the program. The
reachability of states in this space can be investigated, within
the limits of computability and the inherent exponential
nature of the space2, to determine whether a program will
fail or succeed [10]. While tremendous progress has been
made in this field [18], the additional variable, concurrency
and uncertainty aspects that we add introduce combinatorial
increases in the size of the combined state space of the
program and environment system, rendering it prohibitively
large to use reachability as a verification paradigm. A
standard approach in the field is to search for regularities
that can be leveraged to handle the state explosion, for
example the assume-guarantee approach to modularizing a
system, or the use of fairness conditions to eliminate
undesirable states from analysis [18]. In Section IV we will
introduce a regularity appropriate to robotics, the system
period, leveraging the complexity reduction this allows.
Our main tool will be process algebra [5][16]: a formal
model of concurrent computation in which processes can be
built from other processes using composition operators. Our
operators are similar to CSP operators but chosen for their
2
E.g., run time is polynomial in the number of reachable locations but
the number of reachable locations is exponential in the number of variables
of each procedure during execution.

use in robot programs in particular. It does not include a
built-in concept of optimization as does, e.g., the $-calculus
algebra [13]. The algebraic properties of the composition
operators allow process descriptions to be transformed to
investigate issues such as process equivalence as well as
issues of liveness, safety, and deadlock.
In Section IV, we define a process algebra for robot
programs that has an automaton semantics based heavily on
our preliminary work in [20]. Certain reasoning is made
simpler by this approach such as reasoning related to the
periodic program structure and to the flow of variable values
along communication channels.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The robotic software architecture is being built upon the
MissionLab [22] robot programming environment. The goal
of including a software verification component into the
programming environment is to provide pre-mission
performance analysis of the designed robot controller. The
system architecture, Figure 2, supports three phases of the
robot program development: design, verification, and
execution. The design and verification phases plus the user
form a robot program design loop that iterates until the
mission-specific performance guarantee is satisfied or
deemed unattainable. At this point, the operator can proceed
to the execution phase with the confidence that the robot will
meet the requisite mission requirements.

Figure 2: Robotic Software System Architecture

To illustrate the process of designing robot controllers, we
step through the three development phases with a simple
example: a controller for a robot to repeatedly go back and
forth between two locations (A and B). This task, though
simple, captures the main concept of a waypoint controller,
and we will build on this in future work. The finite state
automaton (FSA) of the back_and_forth robot is shown in
Figure 3. While this example only uses one robot, our
system design also supports programming and verification
for multi-robot systems.
A. The Design Phase
During the design phase, the operator designs a controller

for a robot to complete a given mission using CfgEdit
(Configuration Editor), Figure 4. CfgEdit is the graphical
visual programming interface frontend of MissionLab where
the configuration of the robot program is constructed as an
FSA. The configuration of the robot program is based on the
Configuration Description Language (CDL), a specification
language that supports recursive compositions of robot
behaviors that are physical robot-independent [24][22].
At_B

Start

GoTo
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GoTo
B

At_A

Figure 3: FSA for back_and_forth robot

The FSA in Figure 4 implements the back_and_forth
robot in Figure 3. The back_and_forth behavior consists of
two primitive GoTo behaviors, which are provided within a
library of primitive behaviors in MissionLab. More complex
programs can be constructed from this library of primitive
behaviors for more complicated missions (e.g., biohazard
search within a building).

Figure 4: CfgEdit example for back_and_forth robot

To generate the C++ source code for the back_and_forth
robot that can be compiled to control simulated or real
robots, the CDL is first compiled into the Configuration
Network Language (CNL) specification [23]. CNL specifies
a robot program as a directed graph, where nodes represent
primitive behaviors and edges represent dataflow links
between behaviors. The CNL code is then compiled into
C++ code. Finally, the C++ source code is compiled to
generate robot executables for either simulation or mission
execution using real robots.
The operator can simulate the controller design in
MissionLab to verify her design intent before running it on a
real robot. However, to obtain any guarantee that the robot
will successfully complete the required mission in the real
world target environment, a formal verification step is
necessary before robot deployment. Even for the
back_and_forth mission, the slippage between the robot’s
wheels and the floor in the real environment can cause the
robot to fail the mission. One of the goals of the software
verification system is to take into account the model of the
environment (e.g., slippage) as well as noise and failure

models of the sensors and actuators, and provide pre-mission
performance analysis of the controller design.
B. The Verification Phase
One crucial aspect of verification of robot programs that is
different from traditional software verification is that robots
have to interact with real environments both from a sensing
and an actuation perspective. Uncertainty about the world
makes it difficult to predict the exact response of the robot,
which makes formal verification of robot software a unique
challenge. Nonetheless, formal verification is necessary for
critical missions (e.g., c-WMD missions such as finding,
containing, and neutralizing Chemical-Biological-Nuclear
(CBN) weapons) where failure is not an option.
The verification phase of the system design starts by
translating the CNL specification of the robot program into
the language required by the verification module, (see Fig.
2). The verification language, called Process Algebra for
Robot Schemas (PARS), is presented in the next section. We
use CNL as the input to the verification module because the
CNL specification of the robot program is similar to the port
automata based Robot Schemas (RS) framework [20].
For pre-mission performance analysis of a robot, it is
necessary for the verification module to take into account the
mission performance criteria and models of both the robot
hardware and the operating environment. Our system
includes three pre-constructed model libraries for
verification: the robot model library, sensor model library,
and environment model library (Fig. 5-7). The operator can
select from these libraries for different combinations of
robot platforms, sensors, and environments to match the
mission’s conditions. Similarly, for performance criteria, the
operator is offered a selection of customizable criteria in
terms of verification conditions and constraints.
Based on the choices of verification constraints and
robot, sensor, environment models, the verification module
tests the combination of the robot software with the chosen
constraints and models for specific properties of safeness,
liveness, and/or efficiency. At the end of verification, the
verifier provides the operator with performance guarantee
information regarding the robot carrying out the required
mission under the specified conditions. If the result is
unsatisfactory (e.g., some verification constraints are
violated), the operator can use the feedback from the verifier
to iteratively refine the robot program. In other words,
besides simply telling the operator “yes/no” that the robot
program satisfies the specified performance criteria, the
verifier also identifies potential causes of failure in the
program and provides the operator with this useful
information, to assist in mission completion enhancement.
For the back_and_forth example, the operator can verify
her robot controller by choosing a Pioneer robot with wheel
encoders and noisy sonar sensors operating in an empty
room with flat tiled floor and no obstacles. The operator can
also specify a performance criterion such that the robot
needs to be within 0.1 meters radius of each goal’s spatial
location for that leg to be considered successful. Other
mission constraints such as time (e.g., maximum round trip
time = 10 seconds) or minimum battery level can also be

specified. The verifier then conducts a pre-mission analysis
and generate a performance guarantee of whether the robot
will successfully accomplish the mission with specified
performance criteria. If the verifier found that the robot
cannot complete the mission successfully because the
maximum round trip time constraint is violated, it reports
failure along with the violated constraint(s). With the this
information, the operator can make new design choices: e.g.,
increase the robot’s speed or maximum round trip time.
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Figure 5: Notional example of robot model library
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Figure 6: Notional example of sensor model library
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Figure 7: Notional example of environment model library

C. The Execution Phase
The operator makes a go-no go decision based on the
verification result. If a satisfactory performance guarantee is
provided, she proceeds to the execution phase with
confidence that the robot will successfully complete the
mission. Executing the mission with MissionLab is
straightforward [22][24]. The robot program executes on the

robot directly or remotely from a base-station. For more
details on robot, environment, and sensor libraries, see [4].
IV. VERIFICATION MODEL
This section (and the next) addresses the verification
processing in Figure 2 in more detail. It begins by
introducing a regularity that can be used to combat the
exponential nature of the combined system state-space
explained at the end of Section II. The process-algebra tool,
PARS, we have developed to represent programs and
environment is introduced. Examples of robot programs and
environment models which illustrate use of real-value
variables, concurrency and uncertainty are presented. We
then show how tail-recursion in PARS can be used to
represent and identify periodic behavior.
A. The System Period
To address the intractability of the combined system statespace, we identify a program regularity unique to behaviorbased robotics, and we leverage this to modularize the
verification problem. A behavior-based robot interacting
with its environment [2] will respond to a specific set of
environmental affordances as programmed by its behaviors.
In this situation, which we refer to as a behavioral state,
because the robot continually responds to the fixed set of
affordances, a periodic regularity is induced in the combined
state-space. Once an affordance is responded to, the robot
may return to this behavioral state or move to another that
handles a different set of affordances. However, the essence
of the behavioral state is this potential to repeatedly handle a
specific set of affordances. We will analyze the combined
program and environmental models to identify the periodic
structure imposed by behavioral states. First, we introduce
the algebraic framework in which we situate this problem.
B. Verification language – PARS
The process is our basic unit of program and environment
model structure. The port automaton [27] (PA) model,
extended slightly, will provide the semantics for a process.
We formalize processes as automata, and communication
connections between processes as ports. The PA model is
compositional: a composite port connection automaton can
be constructed for a set of communicating PA. We formalize
the ways in which the automata can be composed to a port
connection automaton as process algebra composition
operations. Our structural analysis will be performed
primarily at the more abstract, process algebra level and not
at the more detailed, PA level.
We will write a process P with initial parameter values
u1,u2,… and which produces final result values v1,v2,… as:
Pu1,u2,… v1,v2,…
It is understood that this process refers to a timed PA: a PA
augmented with a duration map and a partitioned set of end
states, which is written as:
P = ( Q, L, X, , , d, T, ,  ) where
(1)
Q is the set of states
L is the set of ports
X = ( Xi | i L ) is the event set for each port
 : Q XL 2Q is the port transition function,

where XL= { (i, Xi) | i L }
d: Q  QT is the timed transition function,
where dom(d)  proj1 dom() =
 = (i | i L) i : Q  Xi output map for port i
  2Q is the set of start states
  2Q is the set of end states

and where there are two mappings
i (u1, u2, …) = 0  
e (v1, v2, …) = 0  
that relate the initial parameter values to the starting states,
and the final result values to the end states of the PA. We
partition the set of end states  into a set of stop end states
+ and a set of abort end states - where a process that
terminates in + is said to stop and a process that terminates
in - is said to abort.
A basic process corresponds to a PA defined using (1).
All other processes are defined in terms of compositions of
these processes. Examples of basic processes include:





Delayt is a process that stops a duration t after it has been
started;
Ranv is a process that stops and returns a random
sample v from a distribution .
Incy and Outc,x are processes that perform input and
output, respectively, on port c and then stop.
Eqa,b , Neqa,b , Gtra,b , etc., are processes that stop when
a=b, ab, a>b, etc., respectively and abort otherwise.

Non-basic processes
operators, e.g.:

are

defined

using

composition

T = Inc1x ; Outc2,x

is process that inputs a value on port c1 and then outputs it
on port c2. In our definition of sequential composition, if the
first PA aborts (terminates in -) rather than stops, the port
connection automaton aborts without proceeding to the
second PA. Mapping this to a standard programming
language such as C, this one operation implements both the
sequence (‘;’) and the conditional (‘if’) operations.
In concurrent composition, both PA execute at the same
time. For example
T = Outc2,x | Inc2x
is a port connection of two PA, one that outputs a value on
its port c2 and one that inputs a value from its port c2; we
use here the simplification that similarly named input and
output ports are connected to each other.
A disabling composition of two processes is written
T=P#Q

and denotes a port connection automaton of P and Q
connected so that whenever P terminates, it causes Q to
terminate, and vice-versa.
Having developed the PARS notation sufficiently far, we
now present some examples of its use for robot programs.
C. Example Programs and Environments
We continue the running example program BFa,b that moves
the robot back and forth between two locations a and b
specified in a global coordinates frame.
BFa,b = MoveToa ; MoveTob ; BFa,b

The MoveTo process moves the robot towards a location. Let
the position of the robot be available on a port p and let the
port v accept a velocity and then move the robot according to
that velocity. We can write a very simple controller as:
MoveTog = Inpr ; Neqr,g ; Outv, s(g-r) ; MoveTog
where s(d) maps a position difference to an appropriate
velocity vector, pulling the robot towards the goal using the
potential field [2] approach until the goal is reached.
In a simple model of the environment, the robot accepts
the velocity on port v and instantly moves at that
commanded velocity. The exact position of the robot at any
time is available on port p, and the robot operates on flat,
obstacle-free terrain:
DEnvr = (Delayt # DOdor # Atr) ; Invu ; DEnvr+ut (2)
DOdor

= Outp,r ; DOdor

This DEnv model implements a discrete integral of velocity
(with time granularity t) to generate position. The actual
position of the robot, at any time, is represented by Atr.
In a more realistic model, there will be noise associated
with the sensors and actuators:
NEnvr,q = (Delayt # NOdoq #Atr) ;
(3)
(RanN(0,s1)e | Invu) ; NEnvr+(u+e) t , q+ut
NOdoq = RanN(0,s2)e ; Outp,q+e ; NOdoq

Here, the velocity that the robot acts on is the command
velocity u contaminated with a zero-mean normal error e.
The position that the robot reads from its odometry on port p
is the actual position contaminated with a zero mean normal
error. See [20] for other kinds of noise models, including
terrain slip, in a similar process algebra framework.
We can also model static obstacles by modifying the
environment dynamics so that if the robot tries to move
through an obstacle, it collides with the obstacle and remains
stuck.
Obsq = Outb,q ; Obsq
OEnvr = (Delayt # Odor #Atr) ; (Invu | Inbq) ;
( Neqq,r+ut ; Set r+ut nq |
Eqq,r+ut ; Set q+e nq ) ; OEnvnq

(4)

Here, Set rq is a basic process that just sets output q=r.
The semantics of PARS allows for a rich description of
process delays and probabilistic functionality. Stochastic
properties that can be modeled include probabilistically
delayed enabling/disabling, and synchronization as well as
random variable values. The dynamic arrival of an object is
captured by ObsGen (for  ~ Exp()):
ObsGen = Ran x ; Delayx ; Obj


Probabilistically delayed arrival and termination, for example
the existence and duration of difficult terrain patches in an
uncertain environment, can be captured as:
TerGen = (Ran t | Ran d) ; Delayt ; (Delayd # Rough) .




Where  ~ Exp() and  ~ N(,) (a combination referred
to as a severity [28]). This framework can represent
previously unseen or unknown objects and events, and the
adaptive/learning algorithms to handle them, as long as the
potential for these events is written in the form above.
We will now look at how periodic behavior, as described in
subsection A, can be represented and identified in PARS.

D. Recursive Processes
The tail-recursive (TR) expression:
T=P;T

describes a process that repeats P continually until it aborts.
The semantics of a TR process is a port connection
automaton that implements such a loop; an efficient
‘implementation’ of recursion. Mapping to a standard
programming language such as C, this implements a ‘while’
loop. Boem and Jacopini [8] established that any language
that implements sequence, condition and loop constructs is,
in fact, sufficient to represent any program.
For convenience, the following notation is used for
sequential compositions:
Pn = Pn-1 ; P and P1 = P

This allows us to ‘unroll’ a TR process:
T = P ; T = Pn ; T n>0
(5)
We can interpret T as a process that goes through multiple
instances of the same computation, P. That is, P is the
periodic aspect of T. As it stands however, this iteration is
history-less. We can include history if we add parameters:
Tu = Pu ; Tf(u) =
n>0, f 0(u)=u
(6)
( )
( )
T offers a repeated interaction with its environment, but now

the effect of previous events after the ith iteration is captured
by the sequence of values of f i(u). In the case that P can
terminate with abort as well as stop, because of the
conditional nature of the sequential composition, we get
Tu = Pu ; Tf(u) =
(7)
( ) n>0
We will refer to f as a parameter-flow function: a mapping
f : ⅅm → ⅅm that relates the values of m parameters in the
nth and (n+1)th iterations of the period P. The use of flow
functions allows us to handle the issue of real-valued
variables (ⅅ = ℝ) transformed by processes, and this feature
is one of the principal motivations in using tail recursion as a
loop construct.
Verification Approach: The period and parameter flow
function associated with a TR process are a concise
implicit representation of the entire state-space of the
process and offer an alternative to explicit state
enumeration.
E. Identifying the System Period
When we analyze a robot program operating in a given
environment, we analyze a concurrent, communicating
composition of the program and the environment (Fig. 1). If
we have a set of TR process equations P1, P2, …, Pm that
form a system Sys through concurrent composition:
Sys = P1 | P2 | …| Pm

then an important question is, can this Sys be rewritten in a
TR form? That is, under what conditions can we develop an
expression for the period of the system in terms of the
periods of its component processes?
For a TR definition of process P, the section of the
process definition between the equal sign and the tailrecursion will be called the period P’
P = P’ P

If the component periods P1’, P2’, …, Pm’ contain port
communication, then those interactions sequence the
component periods with respect to one another, forcing a
partial sequence of computations. In the case that all ports’
communications can be matched, input to output, across the
component periods, then a system period can be identified:
Sys = Sys’ Sys
Sys’ = F(P1’, P2’, …, Pm’)

Where F(.) is a process composition obtained by matching
the port communications in component periods. It may be
necessary to unroll shorter component periods one or more
times using results (5) & (6) to provide sufficient port
communications for a longer component period (longer and
shorter in this context refer to the number of port
communication operations).
F. Implications and Computational Complexity
What is the practical implication of assuming that a system
period exists for the combination of robot program and
environment model? A system period will not exist in the
cases that:
 the processes don’t communicate with each other;
 port communications are unmatched;
 an infinite sequence of unrollings is needed.
With respect to the first case, a robot program that does
not actually interact with its environment can never achieve
any level of performance! This is a major error that should
be flagged. In the second case, unmatched communications
means that some part of the robot program will block
forever, a potential deadlock case that also needs to be
flagged to the attention of the designer.
Finally, an infinite sequence of unrollings is evidence of
a lack of periodic behavior. However, MissionLab’s FSA
program model is based on the kind of behavioral states
mentioned in subsection A.
The computational complexity of calculating the system
period relies on the complexity of the matching process. If
no explicit fan-in or fan-out is allowed, then the
computational complexity is O(n2) where n is the number of
input processes in the (final, unrolled) system.
V. VERIFICATION ALGORITHMS
Here we present by example our approach to the analysis of
the system period to determine if a robot program achieves a
performance guarantee in an environment.
A. Task Completion
A designer may wish to know if a specified system completes
a task (liveness). In our approach, both the system and
property to be verified are specified in PARS. The two
process networks are compared and analyzed, and if the
specified system can be shown equivalent to the property, we
report success (cf. [1],[9]). For example, the designer may
wish to know if the robot arrives and stays in position a after
time t1. We can specify this verification property using
PARS as:
Goal = Delayt1 ; (Delayt2 #Ata ); Delayt3 ; Goal

This states that the robot will be at position a after time t1
and remain there at least a subsequent time t2. Notice that t1,

t2 and t3 are variables not constants. A property specification
process network differs from a process network in that it is
actually a process network constraint expression, a
specification of a set of possible networks.
Consider the deterministic environment model DEnv from
(2) for the BF program. The system in this case is
Sys = DEnvp0 | BFa,b

The first step in our verification approach is to find the
system period from the component periods:
BF’a,b
= MoveToa ; MoveTob
MoveTo’g = Inpr ; Neqr,g ; Outv, s(g-r)
DEnv’r = (Delayt # Odor #Atr) ; Invu

The parameter flow functions (that link variables values in
the nth iteration to those in the n+1th iteration) are:
fBF(a,b) = (a,b)
fMoveTo(g) = g
fDEnv(r) = r+ut
The only port constraints between the environment and the
program are input on port p and the output on port v. The
period of DEnv must be unrolled n times to match the first
part of BF. To match the second part of BF we need to unroll
DEnv again, yielding:
BF’a,b
MoveTo’g
DEnv’r

Sys = Sys p r; Sysr
Sys p = (
)n ; (
( )
Sys1p =
| MoveToa

(

)m
)

To generate the parameter flow function f for Sys1, we need
to propagate values across the port connections between
DEnv’ and MoveTo’. We can associate a set of recurrence
relations with the system flow functions:
Flow Function

fSys1(r) = r + s(g - r)t
fMoveTo(g) = g

Recurrence

rn+1=rn+s(gn - rn)t
gn+1=gn

If we project () the network onto the processes in the
property specification network, and if we reasonably assert
that Delaytn = Delaynt then we have:
Sys’  {Delay, At} =
Delay(n-1)t ; ( Delayt #
Delay(m-1)t ;( Delayt #

( )

);
( )

)

We need to find a structural mapping between the Sys’ and
Goal’ networks. In this case, structural mapping is trivial:
Delay(n-1)t ; (Delayt #
( ));
Delay(m-1)t ;( Delayt #
( ) )=
Delayt1 ; (Delayt2 # Ata ); Delayt3

To complete the mapping, the flow recurrences need to be
solved for n and m for which f n(p0)=a in which case t1=(n1)t and t2=mt.
The automatic construction of system flow functions
requires tracing a variable through a system period. The
complexity is linear in the length of the period. It also
requires substituting values communicated via port
connections. This is linear in the number of concurrent
processes in the period. We use existing tools (e.g. PURRS3)
to solve flow functions.
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B. Task Safety
A safety property states that “bad things” won't happen. We
analyze the system period to make sure that the safety
property is something that is always addressed by the
program. Once again, we will use algebraic equivalence
relations to re-structure the network, and map this restructured network to the property to be verified.
Consider the BF program for the environment model (4)
that includes obstacles, OEnv. A safety property in this
example would be obstacle avoidance: The robot is never
within 1m of an obstacle. As a process network, this is:
G = (Odop | Obsp+q) ; G where q > 1

We analyze the network consisting of an obstacle at location
d with BFa,b :
Sys = Obsd | OEnvp,0 | BFa,b

As before, we obtain the periods of each component process
and construct the system period.
BF’a,b
MoveTo’g
Obs’q
OEnv’r

=
=
=
=

MoveToa ; MoveTob
Inpr ; Neqr,g ; Outv, s(g-r)
Outb,q
(Delayt # Odor #Atr) ; (Invu | Inbq) ;
(Neqq,r+ut ; Set r+ut nq | Eqq,r+ut ; Set q+e nq )

Since the system period must always satisfy the safety
property, the first step is a connectivity check. Starting at
Odo and at Obs (the processes in the safety property) we
follow the port and variable value connections, dividing the
system period network into equivalence classes of processes.
Unless Odo and at Obs fall into the same class, there is no
way to guarantee the safety property. In this case, since there
is no connection from the obstacle process to any part of the
BF network, the safety property fails.
To address the safety property, we need to introduce a
sensor that can report on the object location:
Sensorc = (Inbq | Inpr) ; Gtr|r-q|,c ; Outspq ; Sensorc
This sensor accurately reports on the location of the obstacle
as long as it is less than c from the robot. Modifying BF:
MoveTog = ( Inpr | Inspq ) ; Neqr,g ;
( Gtr|r-q|,h ; Outv, s(g-r) |
Lte|r-q|,h ; Outv, s(r-q) ) ; MoveTog

If the obstacle is within a distance h >c the robot will stop
moving towards the goal (velocity s(g-r)) and instead move
away from the obstacle. Because of the additional
connectivity to the Sensorc process, on examination of the
period of the system, we see that Odo and Obs fall into the
same equivalence class. We have to verify that the
parameters to Odo and Obs satisfy the safety property. We
construct the system period flow function as before,
projecting the system period onto the goal process network,
yielding:
( )=

(
(

)
)

We can match the safety property network if h > 1, and
hence verifying the safety property.
C. Stochastic properties
Now we consider a verification example that includes
uncertain environment. The specification goal will be: The

robot arrives to position a within 10t time units at least 90%
of the time. This can be specified in PARS as:
Goal = Ran x ; Delayt ; Ata ,
where  is a distribution such that P( x ≤ 10t ) ≥ 90%.
Consider the non-deterministic environment model NEnv
in (3). When we analyze the system (NEnv | MoveTo), we now
get the recurrence relation:
rn+1 = rn + (un + en) ,
where
( , ) is a normally distributed random
variable. To handle uncertainty, we need to move from the
case of variables with a single value to variables with a
distribution of values. The domain ⅅm of the flow function
now becomes distributions and the recurrence becomes
rn+1 = rn * ( un  )
Where  = ( , ) and * denotes convolution. If we
simplify our environment models to capture uncertainty and
noise with just normal distributions, or mixtures of normal
distributions, this expression can be solved efficiently. The
)
sum of normal distributions is also normal ( ,
If we include Poisson processes in our environment, to
model arrival times, then we will need to also allow for
exponential-normal interaction. A very important example of
this is the severity terrain model that we presented at the end
of section IV.C. In terms of the recurrence relation above,
this would mean that in addition to
( , ) the solution
n ~ Exp(). A form for the severity distribution is developed
in [28] by Yang and Nadarajah.
VI. DISCUSSION
This paper addresses the pressing need to be able to verify
mission-critical robotic software in the context of its
environment and specific physical hardware (sensors and
actuators) with the goal of providing performance guarantees
to an operator prior to their sending a robot into a potentially
hazardous situation. To do so we have developed a software
architecture that provides visual programming capabilities
and an internal language that is amenable to such analysis.
To verify mission critical robot programs, we need to
analyze a combination of program and environment model,
each of which contains real valued variables, concurrent
activities and uncertainty. A unique regularity of behaviorbased robot computation, the system period, is introduced to
render this complex problem more tractable. A process
algebra, PARS, is introduced to represent and analyze
programs and their environments. The expressiveness of
PARS for both deterministic and stochastic processes, as
well as the proposed verification approach, is illustrated on a
simple back and forth robotic mission.
We are currently in the first year of a 3-year program to
develop and integrate the existing software and incorporate
the new ideas described herein. We anticipate the final
system to be able to operate in a range of environments,
using multiple types of hardware platforms, specified over
teams of robots.
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